This is a republication of a terrorism analysis post I originally wrote on June 1, 2023 over on my dedicated blog site that I am rolling into wonksecurity.com.

A few weeks back, I read a great piece in The Diplomat by terrorism expert Dr. Colin Clarke about the Islamic State in Khorasan Province’s (ISKP) rapid growth in Afghanistan. I hold a great deal of respect for Dr. Clarke’s work and actually had the opportunity to meet him during a work call in late 2021, so of course I immediately shared the article with my LinkedIn connections. Unlike normal, though, I added a few of my own thoughts to my repost, which I plan on sharing here as well.

Before I get into the article, for those who do not closely follow events in Afghanistan, ISKP is the Islamic State’s (read: ISIS or ISIL by some) affiliate branch that operates predominantly in South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. The name refers a historical area spanning Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that holds special meaning to many jihadists for its ties to the so-called “Khorasan hadith,” an apocalyptic prophecy that claims the end-times will be near when black banners ride forth from Khorasan.

This apocalyptic vision plays into the symbolism of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, both of which utilize black flags and claim territory in the historical Khorasan area as means of helping the prophecy along. If you want more context about Khorasan, check out an older article in Time magazine or check out Ali Soufan’s book, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda.

Now onto the article, which I will not be summarizing in full here as I highly recommend you read the article itself. However, two key points really stood out to me, which I will be sharing along with my own thoughts. First, the following quote from Clarke’s article summarizes the current situation in Afghanistan and the broader counterterror ramifications exceptionally well:

“The situation in Afghanistan is beginning to feel eerily similar to the pre-9/11 era, with the Taliban in control of the country and reunited with al-Qaida and the Haqqani Network. Within Afghanistan’s borders, a witch’s brew of terrorist and insurgent groups is metastasizing.”

With the U.S. focusing elsewhere, ISKP continues to rapidly build both membership and capacity. I think that many across America misinterpret a lack of major attacks in the U.S. with a lack of ongoing threats. Yet the lack of attacks stem from continued pressure on jihadist groups that directly threaten Americans. The pressure denies planning and capacity building opportunities, which diminishes the perceived threat. And with the lack of perceived threat comes a lack of funding and attention, which reduces pressure and allows capacity building to take place like it did in the pre-9/11 era. The second major takeaway from Dr. Clarke’s article highlights this mechanism and its ramifications:

“The United States must prioritize combating the ISKP before the group is able to achieve its stated desire to attack the U.S. homeland. At the moment, however, the U.S. national security community has transitioned from focusing on the global terrorist threat to great power competition with Russia and China. U.S. and Western support for Ukraine has allowed Kyiv to fight Moscow to a stalemate so far. But with the redistribution of personnel, financing, and policy bandwidth from counterterrorism to competing with nation-state near-peer adversaries, Western intelligence services are now asked to do a difficult job with fewer resources.”

Unfortunately, it is not just the conditions of Afghanistan that seem familiar to past events. I think that the U.S. seems to be developing a bit of a bad habit of shifting most if not all of its attention to other threats right when its counterterror efforts are at critical do or die moments. Prime examples of this habit include shifting focus to Iraq when al-Qaeda was on the ropes in 2003, and pivoting to Asia right when ISIS was preparing to declare its so-called caliphate come to mind as prime examples. By stopping short of finishing the job, the recommitment of resources after the horse bolts out of the barn makes the response more of an uphill battle later.

I agree with Dr. Clarke’s above conclusion and hope policymakers will remember that a full range of threats continue to demand attention outside the scope of great power politics, preferably before ISKP grows to a capacity that it can endanger even more innocent people in Afghanistan and eventually strike targets abroad. However, I fear that any significant reengagement will come too late and will sadly be in response to a successful attack in the U.S. or Europe. That’s something I hope to be wrong about.